The new scramble for Africa will either perpetuate neo-colonial extraction under new management or catalyse genuine African unity and development, says political researcher Nontobeko Hlela.
Hlela says the choice lies with African leaders: continue as fragmented competitors vulnerable to divide-and-rule tactics, or unite as a continental force capable of shaping the terms of engagement with global powers.
“Only through such unity can Africa ensure that this moment enhances African agency, advances the continent’s commercial interests, and serves the developmental aspirations of its people rather than repeating the exploitation of the past. Africa’s sovereignty and prosperity depend on breaking the neo-colonial pattern. The question is whether its leaders will seize this moment or squander it,” said Hlela, a research fellow at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation.
Islamic teachings offer a clear principle for understanding the issue, viewing wealth and natural resources as a trust rather than an unrestricted possession. Allah says: “Believe in Allah and His Messenger and spend out of that in which He has made you successors” (Qur’an 57:7).
The verse points to a wider principle of stewardship: resources ultimately belong to Allah, while people are entrusted with how they use, distribute and benefit from them.
As global powers compete for Africa’s critical minerals, the question is therefore not only who secures access to these resources, but whether the continent’s mineral wealth is managed in a way that protects communities, creates lasting benefits and avoids another cycle in which Africa’s resources enrich others more than its own people.
Africa’s minerals are becoming the centre of a new global contest.
The players are different from those of the 19th-century Scramble for Africa, and African states today possess formal sovereignty over their resources, but a familiar question remains: who will capture the greatest value from the continent’s wealth?
Critical minerals sit at the heart of modern industry. Rare earth elements are needed for high-performance magnets, electric vehicles, wind turbines and defence systems. Tungsten is valued for its extreme hardness and heat resistance and is used in aerospace and military applications. Tantalum is found in smartphones, computers and other electronics.
As demand grows, access to these materials has become an issue of national security as much as commerce.
China’s advantage lies not simply in owning mines, but in its dominant position in refining and processing. China controls a large share of global critical-mineral refining, including around 85% of rare earth refining in 2025, leaving countries such as the United States and Britain concerned about dependence on highly concentrated supply chains.
Britain’s Critical Minerals Strategy identifies this concentration as a vulnerability and seeks to diversify supply, while the United States has invested heavily in alternative mining and processing networks.
The result is an increasingly intense geopolitical contest between the US and China, with African mineral-producing countries becoming strategically important as both powers seek secure access to resources needed for technology, energy and defence industries.
Kenya at the centre of the contest
Kenya has become one of the clearest examples of this competition.
The coastal Mrima Hill deposit is believed to contain large quantities of rare earth minerals and niobium, which is mainly used to strengthen steel and specialised alloys.
In September, the United States pledged to help Kenya develop a critical-minerals processing industry as Nairobi considers investors for the site.
Washington’s interest is strategic. US officials have identified critical minerals as a priority and linked support for African projects to securing global supply chains.
For the United States, Mrima Hill could provide strategically important materials from a partner country while reducing dependence on Chinese-controlled processing.
Australia’s involvement in Kenya shows, however, that the competition extends beyond Washington and Beijing.
Australian companies have pursued Kenya’s Mrima Hill project, while other industrial economies are strengthening ties with mineral-rich African countries.
Japan, for example, operates through the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC), a state-backed organisation whose mandate includes securing stable resource supplies for Japan.
JOGMEC established its Johannesburg office as a base for African resource development, supports Japanese companies through technical and financial assistance, and has expanded engagement with African governments as competition over critical minerals intensifies.
Britain is similarly seeking diversified mineral supplies and investment opportunities, while European countries are looking to strengthen access to African processing and production.
Together, these moves show that Africa is increasingly becoming a strategic arena for countries seeking to secure the minerals needed for their future industries.
For Kenya, the opportunity is significant. If minerals are processed domestically rather than exported raw, the country could gain jobs, technical skills, tax revenue and new industries.
President William Ruto has emphasised local processing and value addition as part of Kenya’s strategy.
But if foreign firms control extraction, technology, processing and long-term purchasing contracts, Kenya could still remain at the lower end of the value chain even as mining expands.
Why Rwanda matters
Rwanda illustrates another dimension of the mineral race.
Although geographically small, Rwanda is an important producer of tantalum, tungsten and tin, critical industrial metals valued for their durability, high melting points and electrical properties.
According to the US Geological Survey, Rwanda ranked third globally in tantalum production in 2024, accounting for around 15% of global output, and sixth in tungsten production.
The United States has moved particularly quickly.
Toronto-based Almonty Industries recently formed a tungsten venture with Rwanda under a US-backed economic framework. Rwanda will hold a 25% stake, while Almonty retains 75%.
The deal comes before new US defence procurement requirements take effect in January 2027, restricting the sourcing of tungsten used in certain military supply chains.
That timing helps explain Washington’s interest. Tungsten is not simply another export commodity; it is a defence-critical material.
The United States is simultaneously rebuilding its strategic tungsten stockpile, including through a recently announced US defence contract valued at around $2 billion.
Europe has also sought closer mineral ties with Rwanda, while Chinese processors remain deeply embedded in downstream markets for minerals exported through the country.
This creates a complicated picture. Rwanda can use competition between major powers to attract investment and build processing capacity, but its position is overshadowed by the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
A 2026 Global Witness investigation alleged that significant quantities of coltan from M23-controlled mining areas in eastern DRC had been smuggled into Rwanda before entering international supply chains.
It identified China as the leading processing destination for Rwandan-exported coltan and raised serious questions about traceability systems.
Some companies involved dispute the allegations and say they apply due-diligence procedures.
Opportunity or another extractive cycle?
For Africa, this points to the central danger of the new mineral scramble: competition between global powers can increase the value of African resources without necessarily improving the lives of African people.
Foreign investment can bring capital, infrastructure, jobs and technology. Competition can also give African governments greater bargaining power.
Kenya can negotiate between several potential investors rather than relying on a single partner, while Rwanda can seek equity stakes and domestic processing rather than accepting only royalties from raw exports.
Yet Africa still risks remaining a supplier of essential materials while the greatest profits, technology and manufacturing remain elsewhere.
UK government-backed analysis acknowledges that, despite Africa’s mineral wealth, the continent remains comparatively weak in the processing stages where much of the value is captured.
Islamic teachings offer another principle through which to view this question: “Do not consume one another’s wealth unjustly” (Qur’an 4:29).
Natural resources are an amanah, a trust, and their use should serve justice, communities and future generations rather than the enrichment of a narrow group.
The most important question, therefore, is not whether the United States, China or Europe wins the race for Africa’s minerals.
It is whether Africa does.
If African governments insist on transparent contracts, local ownership, domestic processing, skills transfer, environmental protection and fair returns for communities, the mineral race could become an opportunity for industrialisation.
If not, the continent risks entering another era in which its soil powers the prosperity and security of others while its own people receive only a fraction of the value beneath their feet.
