Zeenat Adam examines how Iran is turning the Strait of Hormuz and the wider Red Sea-Suez maritime network into strategic leverage, exposing the vulnerabilities of Saudi Arabia and the global energy system.
At the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 22 September 2026, US President Donald J Trump warned that, in the absence of a deal, he could “annihilate” Iran. The threat came as Washington and Tehran were simultaneously pursuing mediation in New York, underscoring the extraordinary proximity of diplomacy and escalation in the current conflict.
For Iran, however, the strategic contest extends far beyond the battlefield. It encompasses the infrastructure and maritime corridors through which military pressure can be translated into economic and diplomatic leverage.
When Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh addressed academics and diplomats in South Africa in June 2026, he offered a revealing formulation. If Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, he said, it could “play other cards as well.” The remark is significant because it frames Hormuz not as an isolated weapon, but as one instrument within a broader repertoire of strategic pressure. The Iran war is no longer only about Iranian military and nuclear capability, but also about how Tehran has weaponised strategic waterways to exert pressure on the global economy.
Hormuz links the Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Bab el Mandab connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Suez links the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. Together, they form a continuous artery for energy and global commerce. Their importance lies in their interdependence. Disruption at one point increases reliance on another, while insecurity across several points progressively reduces the number of commercially viable alternatives.
Saudi Arabia’s strategic vulnerability
For Saudi Arabia, the world’s second-largest oil producer, that interdependence is becoming a strategic problem. Saudi oil production is concentrated in the east, making Hormuz its principal maritime vulnerability. Riyadh has spent decades reducing that exposure, building the 1,200-kilometre East-West pipeline to Yanbu, with a capacity of around seven million barrels a day, designed to move crude to the Red Sea without transiting Hormuz.
A September drone attack, suspected to have originated from Iranian allies in Iraq, damaged pumping infrastructure and disrupted flows to Yanbu, exposing the pipeline’s vulnerabilities. Saudi Arabia responded by increasing Gulf exports and using ship-to-ship transfers around Oman. The pipeline has since resumed operations, but the disruption exposed the dependence of the alternative route on infrastructure beyond the Strait itself. The consequences have already reached Europe. Aramco cancelled some September-loading cargoes to European customers after the attack, while reports emerged that at least two European refiners had been informed that they would receive no Saudi crude in October under normal term arrangements.
The constraints are not uniform across the Gulf. Producers with alternative loading arrangements have sought to preserve exports through rerouting and ship-to-ship transfers around Oman, allowing some crude and LNG to reach markets at substantially higher logistical and financial cost. Qatar and the UAE have resorted to ship-to-ship LNG transfers outside Hormuz, an unusual measure for LNG cargoes, to maintain deliveries to Asian markets. This creates differentiated regional exposure: some producers can preserve volumes by paying a higher risk premium, while others face more direct constraints on production and export capacity. Qatar’s LNG dependence on Hormuz is particularly consequential, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have greater scope to redirect some crude through alternative systems. The crisis is therefore not simply reducing Gulf energy revenues uniformly; it is redistributing the costs of maintaining them. Most of these countries have already felt the impact of the sustained closure, reporting fiscal deficits and being forced to implement austerity measures.
Bab el Mandab and the Red Sea pressure point
Bab el Mandab is the second major pressure point. From the Red Sea, Saudi exports face two principal directions: south through Bab el Mandab and the Gulf of Aden, or north towards Suez and the Mediterranean. Houthi attacks have already made the Red Sea a contested commercial space. Iran’s relationship with the Houthis is substantial, although the Yemeni movement retains its own political and organisational agency and does not form part of a formal Iranian command structure, despite frequent descriptions of it as an Iranian proxy. For Saudi Arabia, the strategic effect is independent of the precise degree of Iranian direction: insecurity around Bab el Mandab reduces the reliability of its principal alternative to Hormuz. In July 2026, Saudi Arabia, together with 12 other nations, pledged to form a Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance aimed at protecting the waters around Bab el Mandab. Yet the alliance has been unable to remove the uncertainty and insecurity across the arterial network, making alternative routes slower, more expensive and commercially unattractive.
That increases the importance of the northern route and, consequently, of Egypt. Egypt controls the northern gateway of Suez, yet the wider network is itself exposed: in July 2026, a drone strike damaged a gas vessel at the Mediterranean port of Damietta, highlighting the vulnerability of that route. In early September, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, reaffirming support for the freedom and security of navigation in Hormuz, Bab el Mandab and the Red Sea.
Military power versus strategic connectivity
This also clarifies Saudi Arabia’s military dilemma. The kingdom possesses considerable military capability and remains among the world’s largest importers of major arms. Washington has recently approved a potential $24.3 billion sale of 48 F-35 aircraft and associated equipment, although the transaction still requires congressional approval. Yet military capability does not automatically produce strategic connectivity. Aircraft can strike targets; air-defence systems can intercept missiles and drones. Neither can reopen a contested sea lane, secure 1,200 kilometres of pipeline, protect every tanker or eliminate the risk premium imposed by insurers and shipping companies.
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Türkiye and Pakistan, signed in August 2026, provides that an armed attack on one member is to be regarded as an attack on all three. However, the agreement has so far only established a framework for collective defence, without clearly defining its operational parameters. The escalation of Houthi attacks on Saudi territory came too early for the agreement to take meaningful effect. Türkiye has subsequently indicated that it is prepared to meet Saudi military requirements arising from recent Houthi attacks, particularly in technical areas, but cautioned that it does not want to see Saudi Arabia drawn into the US-Iran war amid concerns that the conflict could expand geographically. Pakistan, a nuclear power, has reiterated its commitment under the defence pact without specifying what that would entail.
Following a Saudi request, Britain has pledged to provide an RAF Voyager for defensive air-to-air refuelling of Saudi aircraft, building on its existing support for Saudi air defence. Washington has also increased operational support to Saudi Arabia through intelligence and planning assistance, with Trump considering strikes against Houthi targets. Trump’s UNGA threat raises the stakes further.
Hormuz as a bargaining weapon
Meanwhile, Tehran is demonstrating that Hormuz is not simply a military lever but a diplomatic one. On the margins of UNGA, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff to reiterate Tehran’s conditions for reopening the Strait. According to Iranian state media, these included lifting the US naval blockade, releasing frozen Iranian assets and ending the war across the various resistance fronts. A senior Iranian official also indicated that Tehran could reopen Hormuz within a week if Washington reduced military pressure and lifted the blockade of Iranian ports.
The implication is significant. Hormuz is simultaneously a military position, an economic instrument and a bargaining asset. If Hormuz is one card among several, maritime geography is not merely a consequence of the war; it has become a strategic mechanism that can itself be weaponised.
The global economic impact is dire. Hormuz was the thoroughfare for one-fifth of global oil and gas flows, yet last weekend only 17 commodity vessels transited the Strait, compared with a pre-war average of about 125 commercial vessels per day. Traffic through Bab el Mandab has also declined. Pressure on Hormuz constrains the primary Gulf exit. Damage to the East-West pipeline weakens Saudi Arabia’s land-based alternative. Houthi attacks undermine Bab el Mandab. Vulnerability around Suez complicates the northern Red Sea route. Escalatory war rhetoric further undermines diplomatic efforts and increases the risk of the conflict expanding beyond Hormuz and the other chokepoints, with potentially severe global consequences.
Zeenat Adam is a former diplomat and an independent international relations strategist based in Johannesburg, South Africa.
