By Oumar Ongoiba
Three months after US and Nigerian forces announced the killing of a senior Islamic State (IS) figure described as the group’s “global No. 2”, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is once again striking military positions across north-eastern Nigeria.
The back-to-back attacks on Gajiram and Mandaragirau in August underline a central challenge facing Abuja and its allies: removing senior commanders can disrupt an insurgency, but it does not necessarily dismantle networks with entrenched local recruitment, logistics, intelligence and operational structures.
ISWAP returns to military targets
Last week, ISWAP fighters attacked a military camp in Gajiram, Borno State.
In a statement and photographs released through Amaq, the group’s media arm, ISWAP claimed it had “burnt” the camp, destroyed 18 vehicles — including armoured vehicles — and seized weapons and ammunition. Other sources also reported casualties among Nigerian military personnel.
Five days later, ISWAP struck again, targeting the forward operating base at Mandaragirau.
According to the Nigerian military, the attack began at around 2am, with fighters launching a coordinated assault from two directions.
Following the attack, an ISWAP commander described the offensive as direct retaliation for the death of Abu Bilal al-Minuki, also known as Abu Bakr al-Mainuki. He also warned that “American aircraft” would not “save” Nigerian forces.
Al-Minuki was killed in May 2026 during a joint US-Nigeria operation.
Washington and Abuja described him as a senior Islamic State figure and the organisation’s global No. 2, with involvement in media operations, financing and the development of weapons, explosives and drones.
His death was presented at the time as a major blow to both ISWAP and the wider Islamic State network.
Yet the renewed attacks show that ISWAP retains the ability to mobilise fighters, coordinate assaults and target fortified military positions despite the loss of senior leadership.
Why military bases matter to ISWAP
Military installations remain high-value targets for ISWAP for three main reasons.
First, there is the material value. Overrun bases can provide weapons, ammunition, vehicles and other equipment that can either be reused by the group or displayed in propaganda material.
Second is the psychological impact. Successfully attacking or overrunning a fortified military position can undermine public confidence in the Nigerian state’s ability to protect its own forces and territory.
Third is the propaganda value. Each successful strike serves as proof that ISWAP remains operational, sending a message to recruits, supporters and rival groups that it can continue attacking the Nigerian military despite air strikes, ground operations and US support.
This pattern is not new.
In March this year, the Nigerian military said it had repelled an ISWAP attack on a forward operating base in Gajiram with the assistance of air support.
The fact that the same axis has now been targeted again points to sustained pressure on Nigerian positions rather than isolated raids.
The latest quarterly UN report on the Islamic State threat highlighted a similar trend, warning that ISWAP and other armed insurgency groups operating across Africa continue to adapt and maintain operations despite leadership losses.
The report also noted the considerable autonomy enjoyed by such groups and their ability to exploit weak governance, particularly in border regions.
Al-Minuki’s killing therefore represented a significant tactical success for US and Nigerian forces, but it did not remove the local structures responsible for the daily mechanics of the insurgency — including recruitment, intelligence-gathering, financing and operational planning.
Three months later, ISWAP is still capable of assembling fighters, launching coordinated multi-pronged attacks and producing media content to publicise its operations.
Abuja’s wider challenge
The conflict in north-eastern Nigeria is increasingly as much a battle against organisational resilience as it is a contest of military firepower.
For ISWAP, every destroyed vehicle and overrun military position can be turned into propaganda, feeding recruitment efforts and reinforcing the group’s relevance within the wider Islamic State brand.
For Abuja and its international partners, the greater challenge is turning leadership killings into a sustained reduction in ISWAP’s operational capability.
That requires degrading the group’s local recruitment and logistics networks rather than focusing solely on senior commanders, while ensuring territory and military positions can be held and defended so that the same bases do not become recurring targets.
It also means confronting ISWAP’s influence within communities from which the group draws recruits, intelligence and support, while competing with the organisation’s propaganda narrative.
Until those local structures are significantly weakened, announcements of successful “decapitation” strikes risk being followed weeks or months later by fresh attacks elsewhere in Borno State.
The killing of the Islamic State’s reported No. 2 may have disrupted ISWAP’s links to the wider global network, but it did not end its local insurgency.
The attacks on Gajiram and Mandaragirau are ISWAP’s latest attempt to demonstrate exactly that.
