The United States and Saudi Arabia have signed a landmark civilian nuclear cooperation agreement that could remain in force for 30 years and generate tens of billions of dollars in commercial contracts.
US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the agreement in Washington on Wednesday, 22 July.
Known as a Section 123 agreement, the deal establishes the legal framework through which American nuclear technology, reactors, materials and technical expertise can be transferred to Saudi Arabia.
The US Department of Energy described it as a decades-long, multibillion-dollar partnership intended to support Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear programme while strengthening American influence within the global nuclear energy market.
American companies placed at centre of programme
The agreement is expected to give American companies a leading role in constructing Saudi Arabia’s nuclear infrastructure, including reactors and other facilities associated with generating nuclear energy.
Westinghouse Electric is widely expected to be among the principal beneficiaries because Saudi Arabia is considering large-scale reactors similar to the company’s AP1000 design.
The arrangement gives preference to American suppliers throughout the development of the programme, although Saudi Arabia may still obtain certain materials, components or expertise from other countries when necessary.
Washington views the agreement as a means of preventing competitors such as China, Russia and South Korea from securing a dominant position within Saudi Arabia’s emerging nuclear industry.
The US government has openly presented the deal as serving both commercial and strategic interests by supporting American companies, workers and supply chains while expanding Washington’s influence over Saudi nuclear activities.
Successive US administrations have warned that Riyadh could turn to rival nuclear suppliers unless Washington offered terms acceptable to the kingdom.
Uranium enrichment concerns
The most controversial element of the agreement is the possibility that Saudi Arabia could eventually develop domestic uranium-enrichment capabilities.
Uranium enriched to relatively low levels can be used as fuel in civilian nuclear reactors. However, the same technology can be used to produce highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear weapons.
The agreement reportedly creates a process through which Washington and Riyadh could study and potentially approve enrichment, conversion, fuel fabrication or other sensitive nuclear activities inside Saudi Arabia.
This marks a significant departure from the restrictions contained in the US nuclear agreement with the United Arab Emirates, under which Abu Dhabi renounced domestic uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing.
Saudi Arabia has repeatedly refused to permanently surrender its right to enrich uranium on its own territory.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has also previously warned that the kingdom would seek a nuclear weapon if Iran developed one, intensifying concerns that a civilian programme could eventually contribute to a regional nuclear arms race.
The agreement is accompanied by a bilateral safeguards framework which US officials say will allow Washington to monitor Saudi nuclear activities and prevent American technology from being diverted towards military purposes.
However, nuclear non-proliferation specialists have questioned whether the safeguards are sufficient, particularly because Saudi Arabia has not adopted the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which permits more intrusive inspections of nuclear facilities.
Congressional scrutiny
The agreement must now be submitted to the US Congress for review under the Atomic Energy Act.
Section 123 agreements generally undergo two congressional review periods totalling 90 days of continuous session. Unless Congress adopts legislation rejecting the deal, it can enter into force after the review period ends.
The agreement is expected to face opposition from lawmakers concerned about uranium enrichment, nuclear proliferation and Saudi Arabia’s broader regional ambitions.
Several senators introduced legislation earlier this year seeking to require explicit congressional approval before any US-Saudi nuclear agreement could take effect.
The proposed No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act was backed by senators including Ed Markey, Tim Kaine, Chris Van Hollen, Jeff Merkley, Ron Wyden, Peter Welch and Bernie Sanders.
Critics argue that allowing Saudi Arabia access to enrichment technology would weaken established non-proliferation standards and make it more difficult for Washington to oppose similar demands from other countries.
Supporters maintain that American involvement will provide greater oversight than would be possible if Riyadh obtained nuclear technology from China or Russia.
Saudi Arabia’s strategic calculations
Saudi Arabia says it wants nuclear energy to diversify its economy, reduce domestic reliance on oil and gas and meet growing electricity demands.
However, the kingdom’s nuclear ambitions are also closely connected to its strategic rivalry with Iran and its wider security relationship with Washington.
During Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the White House in November 2025, Saudi Arabia’s demand for stronger US security guarantees was reportedly raised alongside nuclear cooperation.
Riyadh has also signed a defence agreement with Pakistan, the Muslim world’s only declared nuclear-armed state, prompting speculation over whether Saudi Arabia previously viewed Islamabad as a potential source of nuclear protection.
Closer nuclear and security ties with Washington could reduce Saudi Arabia’s dependence on Pakistan while further binding the kingdom to the US-led regional security order.
The agreement represents a major commercial victory for American nuclear companies and a significant expansion of US-Saudi strategic cooperation.
However, the possibility of uranium enrichment and Riyadh’s refusal to permanently rule out a future nuclear weapons capability are likely to ensure that the deal remains fiercely contested during its congressional review.
