Analysis by Oumar Ongoiba in Mali
Armed groups continue to expand across the Sahel, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, despite ongoing counter-terrorism operations conducted by the three countries, which have joined forces within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
However, 2026 marks a turning point: these groups, once largely confined to rural areas, are now pursuing a strategy of gradual expansion towards urban centres, while intensifying economic and security pressures on civilian populations.
In Mali, this shift is reflected in targeted attacks against both military and civilian infrastructure, as well as the imposition of transport blockades along key supply routes. This strategy seeks to weaken state authority while disrupting economic networks. Although national armies retain operational capacity, insecurity has become a daily reality for many communities.
The rise of the GSIM/JNIM insurgency, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, can be explained by its ability to maintain long-term control over certain territories, particularly in central Mali. In these areas, the group has established a form of parallel governance, including the collection of zakat, local social regulation, and the exploitation of informal economies often linked to criminal networks. This model enables the group not only to finance its operations, but also to entrench itself within local communities over time.
Recruitment remains a key operational lever. Young people, often in situations of socio- economic precarity, are enlisted either through economic incentives or coercion. Cross-border dynamics further strengthen this mobilisation capacity. By the end of March 2026, more than one hundred fighters were reportedly recruite in the Douentza region before being redeployed to Burkina Faso to support allied armed groups. This spread of fighters illustrates the increasingly regionalised nature of the insurgency.
Furthermore, signs of a southward expansion towards Mali’s capital are generating growing concern. Concordant local sources report an increased operational presence of GSIM/JNIM elements on the outskirts of Bamako.
This development is widely interpreted as part of a broader strategy aimed at gradually encircling centres of political power. In this context, the authorities have recently demolished livestock markets located within the capital, citing security concerns.
This follows earlier incidents: in September 2024, GSIM/JNIM fighters managed to infiltrate Bamako via these areas, carrying out coordinated attacks against Bamako International Airport and a gendarmerie training school, resulting in multiple military casualties.
The strategic objective of GSIM/JNIM extends beyond military considerations. It is based on a gradual, bottom-up Islamisation strategy, implemented through the infiltration of rural communities and the diffusion of jihadist ideology. In the long term, this approach aims to dismantle existing state structures and replace them with a politico-religious order based on Sharia law.
Meanwhile, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) pursues a distinct but competing strategy. Highly active in border areas between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, the group prioritises direct violence against civilians and the control of natural and economic resources.
The rivalry between ISGS and GSIM/JNIM has resulted in repeated clashes over territorial dominance. Since January 2026, several confrontations have caused significant casualties on both sides, with civilians frequently caught in retaliatory violence.
To address this growing threat, Niger has launched a large-scale recruitment campaign among civilian populations, who are being mobilised as auxiliary forces to support the army, following a similar approach adopted by Burkina Faso. In mid-April, AES leaders also announced a significant expansion of the Confederation’s Unified Military Force, which is expected to reach 15,000 personnel. This measure is intended to strengthen collective military capacity in response to the insurgency.
However, these responses remain primarily security-oriented. The current evolution of the insurgency shows that it can no longer be understood solely through a conventional military lens. It operates within a hybrid framework combining territorial control, social influence, and economic warfare.
Without a comprehensive strategy integrating political governance, economic development, and social cohesion, Sahelian states risk remaining in a reactive posture against an increasingly structured and adaptive insurgency.
(Oumar Ongoiba is ONM’s correspondent based in Bamako, Mali)
With the main Islamist insurgency group Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) seemingly intent on expanded military action in the the Central Sahel – Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, an expatriate Malian, Muhammed Dicko, this week described the situation in the region as “getting harder and harder”.
The Sahel has faced escalating conflict since the collapse of state control in northern Mali in 2012. What began as a localised rebellion has evolved into a fragmented and expanding insurgency driven by JNIM, linked to al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), alongside ethnic militias and state-backed self-defence groups.
The conflict is now driven less by a single front and more by a breakdown of governance, where weak state presence in rural and border regions has allowed armed groups to embed themselves, impose control, and compete with state forces for authority, territory, and civilian loyalty.
Armed Islamist groups have expanded in these spaces due to the lack of security and governance gaps. They routinely target civilians through sieges, kidnappings, improvised explosive devices, forced taxation, and attacks on essential infrastructure, including schools, health facilities, and water systems. In areas under their control, they impose strict interpretations of Sharia law and restrict access, worsening displacement and food insecurity.
At the same time, counterinsurgency operations have also become part of the cycle of violence, with state and allied forces accused of serious abuses including extrajudicial killings, torture, and indiscriminate attacks. This has deepened mistrust between communities and security forces, and in some areas has contributed to local recruitment into armed groups or reliance on self-defence militias.
The situation has sharply deteriorated, with thousands of deaths recorded in 2025 and violence spreading into new areas. In Burkina Faso, JNIM activity has intensified alongside reports of enforced disappearances and shrinking civic space. In Niger’s Tillabéri region, ISSP remains highly active with repeated attacks and civilian casualties. In Mali, violence has expanded further south, alongside continued abductions, forced taxation, and increasing political repression.
Dicko, Vice President of the Mali Community in South Africa, described a worsening humanitarian and security situation to One Nation Media (ONM). He said,
“The situation is getting harder and harder,” adding that armed groups are “attacking the innocent people” and disrupting key supply routes across the landlocked Sahel states. He further noted that road blockages and insecurity have severely affected the movement of fuel and essential goods from West African ports into Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Overall, the conflict continues to expand, driven by collapsing governance, fragmented armed actors, and overlapping cycles of insurgency and counterinsurgency that leave civilians trapped at the centre of violence.