Moegsien Williams examines who really emerged victorious from the conflict President Donald Trump dubbed Operation ‘Epic Fury’, arguing that the outcome is far more complex than the triumphant declarations from Washington and Tel Aviv suggest.
When wars end, the most important measure is not who inflicted the most damage, but who achieved their political objectives. Judged by that standard, the outcome of the conflict between the US, Israel and Iran appears far more complex than the triumphant declarations that emerged from Washington and Tel Aviv during the opening days of the war.
From the outset, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made their objectives clear. They sought to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, cripple its ballistic missile programme, decapitate its political, military and religious leadership, and ultimately create conditions that would trigger the collapse of the “Islamic Republic”.
The confidence was unmistakable. In the first 100 hours of the conflict, the US and Israel reported carrying out more than 100 strikes across 19 Iranian provinces. Targets included the Natanz nuclear facility, the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and key state institutions in Tehran. The campaign also resulted in the deaths of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and several senior military and government figures.
Flush with early battlefield successes, senior American officials projected confidence that the conflict would be short-lived.
US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth described the war as open-ended but insisted Washington controlled the tempo. Trump repeatedly suggested that the campaign was progressing ahead of schedule and hinted that Iran’s resistance was nearing collapse.
Yet events would unfold very differently.
After weeks of fighting, the conflict settled into a costly stalemate. Despite extensive bombardment, Iran’s political system remained intact. No popular uprising materialised. The anticipated collapse of the Islamic Republic never came.
Instead, Washington gradually shifted from military escalation to diplomatic engagement.
Now, several months after the outbreak of hostilities, Trump appears focused on securing an agreement with Tehran while increasingly distancing himself from Netanyahu’s more confrontational approach.
That shift was evident following a recent Israeli strike on Beirut, which reportedly angered the White House at a delicate stage of negotiations. Trump publicly criticised the attack and urged all sides to avoid actions that could jeopardise the peace process.
Reports from American media outlets suggest tensions between Trump and Netanyahu have become increasingly visible, with the US president expressing frustration over Israeli actions that risk undermining negotiations with Iran.
If that assessment is correct, Israel may find itself in the uncomfortable position of having borne many of the political and security costs of the conflict while being largely excluded from shaping its diplomatic conclusion.
Did Iran win or lose the war?
The war’s greatest irony is that despite suffering severe losses, Iran has managed to deny its adversaries many of their central objectives.
Its economy has been battered. Critical infrastructure has been damaged. Senior military leaders have been killed. Yet the Islamic Republic remains in power.
More significantly, Iran demonstrated its ability to impose costs far beyond its borders.
The conflict highlighted the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial portion of the world’s energy supplies pass. Tehran’s ability to threaten disruption to one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints proved to be a powerful source of leverage, underscoring that geography can sometimes be as influential as military hardware.
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the war has been the geopolitical shock felt across the Gulf.
Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have spent decades cultivating reputations as stable business, investment and tourism destinations. The conflict exposed just how vulnerable that stability can be when major powers wage war in their immediate neighbourhood.
For many Gulf states, the war served as a sobering reminder that hosting American military bases does not necessarily guarantee security. Instead, it can transform them into potential targets during regional confrontations.
The result is likely to accelerate a trend already visible across the region: greater strategic autonomy, deeper engagement with emerging powers such as China, and a more pragmatic approach towards relations with Iran.
The conflict may also have dealt a significant blow to efforts to expand the Abraham Accords.
Before the war, Washington had hoped to persuade additional Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to normalise relations with Israel. Today, such ambitions appear considerably more difficult to realise amid heightened regional tensions and growing public opposition.
At home, Trump has faced mounting political pressure as the conflict contributed to rising fuel prices and broader economic concerns. With public support for the war reportedly weakening, the White House has strong incentives to secure a diplomatic exit rather than prolong a costly confrontation.
Based on the limited details that have emerged regarding the proposed agreement, many of the most contentious issues appear to have been deferred rather than resolved. Questions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, sanctions relief and long-term regional security arrangements remain unsettled.
What appears more immediate is the prospect of easing restrictions on Iranian trade, reopening vital shipping routes and reducing the risk of further military escalation.
Whether this ultimately constitutes a victory for Iran depends largely on how victory is defined.
Iran emerged from the conflict bruised, weakened and economically damaged. It lost senior leaders, suffered extensive military strikes and endured significant hardship.
Yet its political system survived. Its strategic influence remains intact. Its adversaries failed to achieve regime change. And they now find themselves negotiating with the very government they sought to dismantle.
Iran may not have achieved checkmate. But neither did Washington or Tel Aviv.
In the end, Operation Epic Fury may be remembered as a conflict in which overwhelming military power delivered tactical successes but fell short of securing decisive political outcomes.
And in that sense, Tehran may have won something arguably more valuable than the war itself: the peace that followed.
